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"We live in an era of interdependence,"
Keohane and Nye

INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVES
The objective of this study is to determine if international
regime theories have any value when examining regime formation
among small to mid range powers.

In addressing this question I

will focus this study on the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN).
First I will overview international regime theory.

Second,

I will briefly discuss Southeast Asia as a region both
geographically and politically.

I will also describe the

previous attempts at regional organization in the region prior to
ASEAN.

Thirdly, I will analyze the formative years of ASEAN

which for the purposes of this study will be from 1967 to 1975.
Additionally I will briefly discuss ASEAN activities from 1975
until 1994.

After completing these portions of the paper I will

determine whether or not ASEAN was or contained a regime during
its formative years.

Here I will be asking the additional

question of how does a regime transform into an organization.

I

believe the data will show that ASEAN was a regime during its
formative years.

Specifically, it was or contained a security

regime during this time period.

In addition, upon determining if

there was a regime, I will use appendices A and B to ask specific
questions about ASEAN as a regime.

Appendix A is a series of

questions that allow us to compare and contrast one regime with
another.

Appendix B is a template of regime formation theories
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to be tested.

In the conclusion I will return to the central

question of this study (i.e., does international regime theory
have any value when examining regime formation among small to mid
range powers?)

HETHODOLOGY
The research methodology utilized for researching these
questions is historical in nature.

Hy

primary research tool was

Horris Library and other sources for published works.

The

templates in appendix A and B are from Oran Young's works (Young,
1989. 29),

(Young and Oshernko. 1993. 263-266).

I expect the results of my study to disprove the theory that
a hegemon is necessary for the formation of a regime.

However, I

also expect to find that individual leadership is a necessary
component of regime formation, and without strong leadership by
one or more individuals regime formation will be unlikely to take
place. 1
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"What is most striking, ... is the sheer number of international
regimes."
Oran Young

REGIME THEORY
We live in a world of increasing complexity and
interdependence.

But, as Robert Keohane points out,

"interdependence in the world political economy generates
conflict" (Keohane 1984. 243).

With the rising complexity of the

world political economy, it becomes even more important for
nation states to find ways to cooperate.

So, how do nations

cooperate in this new environment of increasing complexity and
interdependence?

The answer to this question in many issue areas

is through international regimes, which have increased
dramatically in number since World War II.

Quite simply, we live

in a world full of international regimes and they are not going
away. Realization of this fact has led to the study of
international regimes by political scientists in the hope of
finding explanations for regime formation, change, and decay.

In

addition, if cooperation is to be fostered and conflicts avoided,
an increased number of regimes may be an attainable alternative
to a world government.
When thinking of regimes it may be useful to think of a
traffic light, which can be a nuisance at midnight when no other
cars are around but extremely helpful or even life saving during
the Monday morning rush.

Like traffic lights, regimes can

facilitate the interactions of nations during times of crisis
(i.e., rush hour) and peace (i.e., midnight).
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However, to extend

the traffic light analogy, one of the key questions for regimes,
is, who provides the traffic light?
intersection?

The hegemon or users of the

If a hegemon provides the light, does it control

the timing when the light turns from red to green (what about
yellow)?

Or as the hegemon wanes, do nations share the expense

for the light?

If the expense for providing the light is shared

among nations, does the hegemon retain control or is control of
the traffic light shared?

These are the types of questions that

the literature on regimes has addressed over the last twenty
years.
The types of international regimes are almost endless,
ranging from security regimes to monetary and commodity regimes.
But what exactly is a regime?

And how do we differentiate

between an international regime and an international
organization?

At least four definitions of regimes have been

proposed over the last fifteen years.

The most influential is

that of Stephen Krasner, who defines international regimes as
"principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around
which actor expectations converge in a given issue area" (Krasner
1983: 1).

The second and possibly the most comprehensive is

Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins argument that "for every
political system,
(Krasner 1983: 62).

there is a corresponding regime"
The Third and most specific definition

defines regimes as multilateral agreements between nation states
within a given issue area (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 495).

The

fourth and most recent definition comes from a conference held at
Dartmouth college in 1992.

At the conference fifteen scholars
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studying international regimes defined them as "social
institutions composed of agreed-upon principles, norms, rules,
and decision-making procedures that govern the interactions of
actors in specific issue areas"

(Young and Osherenko 1993).

In

other words regimes are social institutions, and like many social
institutions they mayor may not be formally articulated or
organized.
In addition to an agreed upon definition of what is an
international regime it is important that there is a

delineation

between international regimes and other international
institutions.

Robert Keohane addressed this in the edited

volume, Regime Theory and International Relations in which he
writes; "International institutions include formal
intergovernmental or transnational organizations, international
regimes, and conventions.

International organizations are

purposive entities, with bureaucratic structures and leadership,
permitting them to respond to events. International regimes are
institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments,
that pertain to particular sets of issues in international
relations.

Conventions are informal institutions, with implicit

rules and understandings that shape the expectations of actors"
(Rittberger 1993: 28-29).
The last twenty years have seen a myriad journal articles
and books published on the formation, change and decline of
regimes 2 resulting in different theories from the different
schools of thought (realist, functionalist, etc).

In general,

four theories recur throughout the literature, distinguished by
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whether they are power based, interest based, knowledge based, or
focused on contextual factors. 3

In addition to theories of

regime formation there have been numerous attempts to explain
regime change and decay (strength, organizational form, scope,
and allocational modes).4

Furthermore, there have been

additional completely theoretical approaches to change which
include game-theory and cognitive approaches. S
REGIME FORMATION

The most popular and parsimonious theory of regime formation
is power based in the sense that it assumes the formation of
regimes depends on the power configuration in the international
system.

The most widely accepted and discussed power based

theory is the Hegemonic Stability theory, which postulates that
the most powerful state in the global order facilitates and forms
regimes.

Furthermore, the hegemon not only maintains a

regime(s), but its continued involvement is necessary for the
maintenance of a regime(s).

The theory also postulates that

regime decline can be traced to the decline of the hegemon
itself.

The hegemon does not act out of benevolent kindness but

rather sees the cost of providing for the regime as being less
than the benefits received.
This theory has developed two sub-schools of thought.
The first holds that a benign hegemon provides regime(s) as a
public good regardless of other nation's ability to contribute
because it feels the benefits outweigh the costs.

The other view

maintains that the hegemon uses its dominant position to impose
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regimes on other actors, regardless of the consequences for the
actors that the regime is imposed upon.

In addition, some power

based theories list other aspects that need to be taken into
account when examining regime formation.

These include but are

not limited to the balance of power between nations, and the
ideological outlook of potential regime members.
These mayor may not have relevance depending on what type of
regime is being examined.

These factors and others connected

with the power based approach are in the template for examining
regime formation (see appendix B).
In addition to the power based approach, some theorists of
regime formation stress factors other than power as being the
prime reasons for regime formation.

Arguing that only by

examining the organizational form, scope or range of issues
covered, and the resource allocation can the actual cause of
regime formation be determined (i.e., cognitive, or interest
based theories, see appendix B).
REGIME ·CHANGE

The approaches to regime change bear a resemblance to works
on regime formation and are more extensive.

The works are mostly

structural and power based and utilize the hegemonic approach.
Starting with the premise that a hegemon is necessary, they go on
to examine the decline or change in international regimes.

Most

work centers around the so called period of American Hegemony and
its subsequent decline. 6
have also

Strategic and game-theory approaches

sought to explain regime change and behavior.

However, with these theories "the attended risk is
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oversimplification," as noted by Haggard and Simmons.

Another

approach is the functionalist approach which attempts to "explain
behaviors of institutions in terms of their effects" (Haggard and
Simmons 1987: 506).

The last approach is the cognitive approach

which argues that "learning and, in a somewhat different fashion,
ideology, affect international rules and cooperation by showing
the merit (or futility) of certain lines of action" (Haggard and
Simmons 1987: 508).

The appeal of this approach is that

ideological and like thinking in certain issue areas seem to have
a causal relationship with regime formation and change.

An

example of this would be the GATT and the consensus supporting
free trade.

However, as Haggard and Simmons point out, sorting

out the influence of ideology and the influence of shared
knowledge can at best prove extremely difficult.

Lastly, when

examining regime change research should also take into account
the domestic affairs of nations comprising the regime.

This

examination needs to be undertaken particularly when the regime
is suspected of influencing the policy makers of a country
(Haggard and Simmons 1987), (Young and Osherenko 1993).
SUHHARY

With the growing interdependence of the world and the
increasing numbers of international regimes it is important that
an attempt be made to understand the dynamics of international
regimes.

This takes on greater relevance as the borders of the

world melt away with the advent of increased communication and
transportation means at the disposal of both government and
nongovernmental actors.

This is even more important when one
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considers that many transnational actors outside the control of
formal governments have significant impact on regimes.

An

example of this would be the declining control that central banks
exercise over the money regime.
However, most of the works on international regimes have
centered on European/Western, hegemonic, and natural resource
regimes.

ASEAN does not fit in any of these categories and thus

provides an opportunity to test the broader relevance of
conclusions drawn from studying them.

Failure of existing

theories to explain the ASEAN case will raise doubts about their
universality.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
Strategically located between the Indian and Pacific Oceans,
the nations of Southeast Asia sit astride the main sea lanes
between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

The significance of

these maritime routes to the world economy is evident in the
quantity of material that Japan alone receives via these routes.
In 1982 it was reported that "Every day of the year more than
700,00 tons of crude oil and 110,000 tons of iron ore are put
ashore in Japanese ports.

Some 90 percent of each of these vital

raw materials pass through the Straits of Malacca and the Lombok
Straits" (Tilman 1987: 107).

Unequivocally, the region's sea

lanes are an integral part of the international economy and of
vital interest to the entire industrialized world.

Furthermore,

mainland Southeast Asia has been and continues to be viewed as a
gateway to China's southern provinces. Thus for these and other
reasons the region has attracted considerable attention from
extra-regional powers.
The region consists of ten nations that are divisible into
two distinct geographical divisions.

First is the mainland group

composed of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.

A

second geographical division is the insular cluster consisting of
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore.

The

region can be further subdivided into three political groups.
First is Indochina composed of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
second is the self imposed isolation of Burma.

A

The third and

largest political subgroup is the six nations that comprise the
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Association of Southeast Asian Nations (i.e., Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore).
In order to understand the region's politics and current
borders a historical understanding of the region is necessary.
The region has had a long period of European colonization with
the first being the Portuguese possession of Malacca in 1511.
Shortly thereafter the Spanish claimed the Philippines and the
Dutch claimed Java.
Malacca.

In 1641 the Dutch ousted the Portuguese from

The French and English arrived in the late eighteenth

century interested in the China trade and turned their attention
towards mainland nations of Thailand, Burma and Indochina.

The

British took Malacca from the Dutch then occupied Singapore. In
addition the British colonized Burma, North Boreno and part of
Brunei.

The French first began their contact in Southeast Asia

with missionaries in Indochina.

This led to an interest with the

China trade as they began their occupation of Indochina.

Upon

completion of the French colonization of Indochina only Thailand
remained independent.

Thailand was allowed to retain its

independence to serve as a buffer state between the French and
British.

In 1896 the Spanish lost the Philippines when the

Filipinos revolted for independence with American support.
However, after defeating the Spanish the United States continued
the period of colonization by occupying the Philippines.
Thus, from the start of the twentieth century until World
War II, all the nations of Southeast Asia had been colonized by
the Europeans except Thailand.
political face of the region.

World War II changed the
The defeat and expulsion of the
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Europeans and Americans by the Japanese marked the end of the
colonial era and sparked the struggle for independence.

It took

numerous years for all the foreign powers to relinquish their
claims to the region, but the aura of the invincibility of the
Europeans and the subservience of the region was ended.

Some

results of the colonial era and World War II were a distrust of
the Japanese and an awakening of nationalism in the region.

The

first nation to gain independence after 350 years of foreign rule
was the Philippines. Indonesia gained its independence after a
bloody struggle with the Dutch in 1949.

Malaysia negotiated

peacefully with the British and gained independence in 1957.
Singapore received independence in 1963 and united with the
Malaysian federation.

Shortly thereafter, in 1965 Singapore left

the Malaysian federation and became fully independent.

Burma

gained independence from the British in 1948 after a short period
of violent opposition to the British.

The Indochinese states had

a much rougher road, with Vietnam achieving reunification as a
nation in 1975.

Laos ended its violent civil war in 1975 and

accepted a special relationship with Vietnam.

Cambodia continued

to be a zone of intense turmoil and conflict well into the 1990s.
When considering regional cooperation it must be noted that
prior to the arrival of the Europeans the idea of nationalism was
an unknown concept.

The political power in the region centered

around the capitols and their rulers.

These rulers lost their

influence as the distance from the throne increased with no clear
boundaries, only frontiers between nations.

Even today this

concept of a loss of control as the distance from major cities
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increases is still evident in the region.

Examples include the

outlying islands in insular Southeast Asia and the highlanders
versus the lowlanders on the mainland.
Additionally, foreign drawn borders are not always
reflective of pre-existing geographical and ethnic and religious
boundaries.

This colonial legacy of foreign drawn borders has

proven to be a difficult problem both in Southeast Asia and other
areas of the world.

The region also has to deal with religious

prejudices, ethnic conflicts and animosities, and numerous
territorial disputes.

These factors combined, make the concept

of regional cooperation difficult.
Following World War II Southeast Asia was again thrust into
an extra-regional conflict.

With the rise of the Cold War the

nations of Southeast Asia became a de facto battle ground between
the capitalistic free world and revolutionary communism.

The

Soviet Union, China, and the United States have each influenced
the region differently as their views of the region changed.

In

response to this quagmire of hegemonic conflict the nations of
Southeast Asia found themselves having to decide what path to
take.

Briefly, by the early 1960s Burma had chosen isolation.

The Philippines after a previous period of close ties with the
United States chose to continue their relationship with the
United States.

Indonesia chose an independent, left leaning

course under Sukarno with the PKI (the Indonesian communist
party) gaining considerable influence.

Following the demise of

Sukarno in 1965, General Suharto (later president) continued an
independent course but destroyed the communist presence in
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Indonesia.

North Vietnam aligned first with the Chinese, then

with Soviets, and South Vietnam with the United States.

Thailand

aligned with the United States and like the Philippines allowed
American troops to be stationed there.
regional policy as did Singapore.

Malaysia supported U.S.

Under Prince Sihanouk,

Cambodia took a middle of the road path trying to play one side
against another,

Laos was split and embroiled in a civil war in

the 1950s and 1960s.

Brunei was still a British protectorate and

remained so until 1984.

One factor that each nation shared in

the post World War II period was an active communist presence.
Both the Soviet Union and China supported the revolutionary
activities of these groups.
In summary, "Geography, history, language, and culture have
all conspired against the countries of ASEAN to make their tasks
of nation building and economic development more difficult.

Of

the five countries considered here only Thailand has any
reasonable claim to nationhood, described in its ideal form by
Rupert Emerson as "a single people, traditionally fixed on a
well-defined territory, speaking the same language and preferably
a language all its own, possessing a distinctive culture, and
shaped to a common mold by many generations of shared historical
experience." Within the ASEAN states, the search for nationhood
has been and continues to be, a major concern of every regime"
(Tilman 1987: 154).
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EARLY ATTEMPTS AT COOPERATION
The first attempt at a regional organization and cooperation
in the region was the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization founded
in 1954 (SEATO).

SEATO was not initiated by the region's nations

themselves, but rather it was initiated and backed by the United
States in line with its containment policy against Communist
China.

SEATO lasted until 1977, but was never more than a

security alliance with the U.S. and had no real affect on
regional cooperation (the only actual Southeast Asian members
were Thailand and the Philippines).

The second attempt at

regional organization and cooperation and the first without extra
regional membership was the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA).
ASA, initiated in 1961 by Malaysia, Thailand, and the
Philippines, "was intended to be an embryonic alternative rather
than a substitute for SEATO" (Leifer 1989: 28).
to promote economic and cultural cooperation.

ASA's goal was
The organization

had a brief life lasting only six years, collapsing over the
conflicting claims to Sabah by both the Philippines and Malaysia.
Maphilindo was another attempt at regional organization
undertaken in 1963.

This attempt was a proposed confederation of

the three Malay speaking countries of Southeast Asia, Indonesia,
Malaysia and the Philippines.

Maphilindo also proved to be short

lived, collapsing as a result of armed conflict between Indonesia
and Malaysia.

Though these two attempts at regional organization

collapsed, they showed that the leaders of the region perceived a
need for regional cooperation.

It seems that these organizations

failed for four reasons:
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- Lack of membership (particularly Indonesia the largest of
non-communist nations)
- The governments were immature and unstable
- The nations were not ready to commit to an organization
- The norms and principles necessary for cooperation were
not ingrained by the regional leaders
Nonetheless, these attempts at regional cooperation proved
valuable for ASEAN.

ASA in particular served as guide for

cooperation while Maphilindo provided declaratory inspiration
(Leifer 1989: 29).

Moreover, each of the nations that were to

form ASEAN faced a similar set of problems that their governments
wanted to resolve or at least mediate.

The most important of

these shared problems was the need for internal stability on
.which to build not only the individual nations but to preserve
the power bases of national elites.

These elites all had an

inclination towards at least some form of capitalism.

The

nations that were to comprise ASEAN also were all anti-communist.
Some elites were anti-communist for purely ideological reasons,
but what they all feared most was the continued instability that
the communist insurgencies were causing in each of their nations.
Yet none of them, though desiring a stable environment, were
ready to sacrifice any sovereignty to a higher goal such as an
international organization.
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"ASEAN exists because it serves a need."
Malaysian Prime Minister
ASEAH
1961-1911
Within the aforementioned climate a consensus emerged among
the non-communist nations was reached that a regional
organization was necessary.

Thus, the Association of Southeast

Asian Nation was established in 1961 with the signing of the
Bangkok Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (Brunei became
a member in 1984).

Drawing on the principles of ASA, the ASEAN

declaration stated its primary purpose and aims were to:
"To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural
development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirt of
equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation
for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian
Nations" (appendix C).
However, the implied purpose was to promote political stability
and regional security in response to the perceived communist
threat.
But what were the bases of cooperation?

The record shows

that no nation was willing to sacrifice national interests for
the sake of a regional institution.

Still each member must have

perceived at least some potential gains from joining.
Yet after signing the Bangkok Declaration was ASEAN a regime
or an entity that contained a regime?

On initial examination and

utilizing Krasner's and Keohane's definition of international
regimes (see above), ASEAN seems to have constituted a regime.
Specifically it constituted a security regime because the
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specific issue area on which ASEAN primarily focused attention
was the achievement of internal security through regional peace
and stability.

At the macro level each of the founding members

desired this, but in the beginning the shared "principles, norms
and decison-making procedures" that are defining characteristics
of a regime were absent (Krasner 1983: 1).

However, the nations

that founded ASEAN realized that this lack was a hindrance to
regional cooperation and therefore to the achievement of a core
value for each of them.
"The five founding governments of ASEAN were drawn together
by a recognition of the self-defeating and wasteful nature of
contention among neighboring states ... " (Leifer 1989: 1).

The

leaders of the nations realized these fundamental problems and
hoped to establish some principles and norms that they could
agree on.

This is why the foreign ministers met in Bangkok,

taking the first step towards cooperation by agreeing to
disagree.

This view of ASEAN's formation was clearly articulated

by the Prime Minister of Thailand at the 1976 Bali Summit.

"The

Association has given our respective countries the framework
within which to strengthen social, economic and cultural ties
among ourselves, and to develop cooperation where, hitherto, none
had existed" (ASEAN 1978:103).

This objective of trying to find

issues were cooperation could take place is contained in the
preamble of the Bangkok declaration:
"Mindful of the existence of mutual interest and common
problems among countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the
need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional
solidarity and cooperation" (appendix C).
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The declaration established ASEAN as loose and decentralized
with the foreign ministers of each member making up the highest
decision making authority.

A standing committee consisted of the

Foreign Minister and the resident ambassadors of the four other
members in the host nation for the year, and so the chairman and
membership rotated annually.

Structural machinery was

established for committees to study specific areas but these were
primarily ad-hoc.

Further highlighting the decentralized

structure of ASEAN during this period was that each country had
its own national secretariat.

The reason for adopting such a

decentralized structure in 1967 was the fear of a loss of control
or sovereignty to a centralized institution.

The founding

members had common fears and concerns, but no consensus existed
among the region's leaders on how to resolve them.

This was due

to national perceptions of both internal and domestic problems.
But what were each nation's reasons for joining ASEAN?
Indonesia played a pivotal role in ASEAN's founding as the
largest and most populous nation of Southeast Asia, and it is
arguable that without its acquiescence and leadership the
organization would have never came into being.

After the demise

of Sukarno following a coup attempt in 1965, Indonesia under
Suharto "renounced radical nationalism" but did not want to ally
with either the communist or the free world (Leifer 1989: 1).
The assumption of power by Suharto had the effect of "expanding
significantly a pattern of conformity in political outlook
already encompassing Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the
Philippines" (Leifer 1989: 1).

Further, "In 1966, Suharto's New
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Order government, dominated by the armed forces, but with the
advice of Western-educated technocrats, embarked on a program of
economic rehabilitation and development"

(Palmer 1987: 32).

These priorities moved Indonesia to seek regional stability and
thus to see advantage in joining a regional organization.
Suharto also envisioned Indonesian leadership in the Association,
evident by both the choice of location for ASEAN's headquarters
(Jakarta) and the first meeting of ASEAN leaders in 1976 (Bali).
Malaysia's motivation for joining ASEAN was the view that
the region's best prospects for growth and stability hinged on
removing extra-regional powers from Southeast Asia.

This view

was understandable after the long fight with a communist
insurgency that was rumored to be supported by China.

Malaysia

saw in ASEAN the opportunity to promote the concept of
neutralizing the region from great power interference. Thus
Malaysia become the prime mover behind ASEAN's eventual adoption
of a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1972.
Singapore, severed from Malaysia by irreconcilable ethnic
differences only two years after joining the federation, was
striving in 1967 to develop a Southeast Asian identity.
Sandwiched between Malaysia and Indonesia, and both promoting
some type of regional cooperation, Singapore had little choice
but to go along with the regional tide.

Joining ASEAN also

helped to ease the fears and suspicions of other nations who saw
Singapore as a Chinese outpost.

In addition Singapore's leader

Lee Kuan Yew saw in ASEAN a vehicle to gain additional support of
the island republic's sovereignty status.
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However, Singapore's

strong anti-communist bent and sense of vulnerability caused
Singapore to support a U. S. military presence in the region.
This later led to resistance by Singapore to Malaysia's proposal
for neutralizing the region from great power involvement.

The

relationship between Indonesia and Singapore also was strained
but after realizing the importance that President Suharto placed
on ASEAN, Lee Kuan Yew took great pains to establish a close
personal relationship with Suharto (Leifer 1989: 40).
Thailand, with the longest land borders of any ASEAN state,
was deeply concerned with the communist insurgencies both at home
and in its neighbors Laos and Cambodia.

The Thais' also feared

the long term consequences of the Vietnamese conflict.

Under

military and strongly anti-communist governments, Thailand not
only supported U.S. involvement in Vietnam but allowed the basing
of U.S. troops within her own boundaries.
response to President Johnson's

Furthermore, in

"Many Flags Program" and to

ensure continued defense support from the U.S., Thailand
dispatched its first contingent of troops to South Vietnam in
September 1967 (Leifer 1989. 84).

Nevertheless, Thailand saw

security advantages to joining ASEAN and hosted the delegation of
foreign ministers to formally sign the ASEAN Declaration.
The Philippines security was guaranteed by the U.S. and so
it joined less for security reasons than for long term economic
prospects.

In addition the Philippines shared the concern of

other members for communist movements within their own borders.
Though all the founding members had various reasons for
seeking membership they all shared some commonalties that
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ultimately helped to make the Bangkok Declaration possible.
First, the governments of each nation were conservative in nature
and held "a common belief that political stability and continuity
of leadership should assume priority over political participation
in order to create the necessary climate for rapid economic
growth"

(Job 1993. 152).

Still, even with the desire to cooperate ASEAN, narrowly
averted collapsing during the first two years of its existence
because the Philippines revived a claim to Sabah.

In addition,

tensions existed between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia over
control and accesses to shared maritime routes.

Thailand and

Malaysia had to contend with a border drawn during the colonial
era that did not reflect the actual human geography (i.e. the
ethnic Muslim population) which was a source of friction between
the two.
From ASEAN's founding in 1967 until 1971, the annual Foreign
Ministers meetings did not accomplish anything concrete other
then to agree to continue consultations.

The communique released

after Fourth Ministerial meeting in Manila in 1971 failed even to
mention the widening war in Indochina or the fall of Cambodia's
government under Prince Sihanouk (Leifer 1989: 53).

Nevertheless

support continued for ASEAN because if nothing else the
uncertainty of the region forced them to continue to make
attempts at cooperation.
By Keohane's definition of international institutions (see
above), until 1972 ASEAN was neither an international
organization nor a regime.

It was not an organization because
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the loose structure did not provide for clearly articulated
purposes, bureaucratic structures or leadership which would have
permitted them to respond to events such as the fall of
Cambodia's government.

As discused above, during this period no

issue area or even norms or principles existed to classify ASEAN
as a regime.

But, by the actions and movement towards agreement

in certain issue areas, ASEAN might be considered an embryonic
regime, although it was not shaping the expectations of its
members.

In addition in 1971 ASEAN had not received recognition

from any of the great powers, nor had ASEAN as an entity met with
other international organizations.

It was not until 1972 that

the ASEAN delegates to the United Nation held their first caucus
(Leifer 1989: 53).

In retrospect just holding together as an

entity was a significant accomplishment 1967 until 1972.

This

period helped to establish relationships between the ruling
elites of the different nations, which according to knowledge
based regime formation theories is necessary for effective regime
formation.
1972-1977
The turning point for ASEAN came in 1972 in response to
regional events.

The most significant of these events was Henry

Kissenger's visit to Beijing, which precipitated the above
mentioned first caucus of ASEAN delegates at the United Nations.
However, the delegation was unable to define a common stand on
the People's Republic of China taking China's seat at the United
Nations (Leifer 1989: 53).

The assumption of the United Nations

seat by the People's Republic in October 1971 and President
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Nixon's decision to disengage from Vietnam forced the members of
ASEAN to improve cooperation,

Though not in complete agreement

on how to proceed, action was undertaken on the Malaysian
proposal for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality,

The

initial Malaysian proposal called for guarantees by the great
powers but this was rejected in favor of a watered downed
version.

The dilution was necessary because Thailand and the

Philippines, close allies with the U.S., supported the U.S.
presence not only in the region but in South Vietnam.
Nonetheless, all member in November 1971 at Kuala Lumpur,
ratified the ZOPFAN declaration (appendix F). The declaration
contained the collective commitment that:
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary
efforts to secure the recognition of, respect for, South
East Asia a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free
form any form of manner of interference of outside powers;
that the South East Asian countries should make concerted
efforts to broaden the areas of co-operation which would
contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer
relationship (appendix F).
The most important result of this meeting was not the
declaration itself, which even the signatories knew was
unobtainable, but that ASEAN cooperation was increasing.

"It

indicated the semblance of a diplomatic community as it became
increasingly necessary for regional partners to forge a common
response to common regional problems" (Leifer 1989: 58).

Yet

even with this accomplishment ASEAN was still not a united group.
One could argue that at this point the leaders of ASEAN viewed it
as a club for senior officials to meet and discuss various
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regional issues but it had no impact on the decision making
processes.

The cease-fire talks between North Vietnam and the

United States in Paris and inevitable fall of South Vietnam
highlighted the need for increased cooperation in order to be
prepared for the post-war situation.
In 1971 the United Nations issued a report on ASEAN
cooperation which had the effect of increasing cooperation
between the member nations.

In the area of economic cooperation

the report had a catalytic effect on the organizational efforts
of ASEAN. The United Nations report showed that "clearly, the
organization could not continue to operate under the direction of
the foreign ministers, particularly in the economic field"
(Palmer 1987: 42).

The impact of the report was important for

ASEAN's evolution because it focused attention on the
association's stated purpose, of economic cooperation.

This was

significant because even though the permanent committees had no
real impact on the decision making process it increased
consultations at many other levels.

A significant step towards

the reality of an organization was taken in 1973 with the holding
of joint strategy sessions to prepare for the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) meetings (Palmer 1987, 43).
Consequently, by 1973 cooperation had increased and at the
Seventh Ministerial Meeting the issue of establishing a Central
ASEAN Secretariat was discussed.

The Singapore Foreign Minister

stated "Unless we consolidate ourselves in economic cooperation,
it would be difficult for others to regard ASEAN seriously"
(Palmer 1987, 44).

Thus by 1974 it could be argued that ASEAN
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had evolved dramatically toward becoming an international
organization, and may have at this point contained a regime.

A

regime with the norm that member nations should undertake joint
consultations prior to approaching other international entities
such as the GATT.

However internal drift remained high.

An

example, was the decision by the Philippines and Thailand to
establish diplomatic ties with the Peoples Republic of China,
which was not received with enthusiasm in Jakarta (Leifer 1987:
65).

Moreover, the Indonesian decision to annex East Timor

received an adverse resolution from the United Nations with
Singapore abstaining from a vote of support.

Singapore felt it

could not support this move for fear of its own sovereignty
(Leifer 1987: 65).

The primary reason that ASEAN did not

collapse during this period can be traced to the continued
communist insurgency in the region and the fear of becoming
dominos in the Cold War battles between communism and the free
world.
For ASEAN the impetus to transform into a bonafide
international institution was the success of revolutionary
communism in Indochina in 1975.

Though scheduled earlier, the

eighth ASEAN ministerial meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur only
two weeks after the fall of Siagon.

It was at this meeting that

the foreign ministers "took up the agenda of economic cooperation
and issued a mandate to the ASEAN permanent committees to give
high priority to projects that would enhance trade liberalization
and industrial complementation"

(Palmer 1987: 45).

At this

meeting the ministers also agreed on a draft proposal for an
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ASEAN Secretariat and a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation to be
considered by their governments.
Shortly thereafter the Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam
Malik proposed a summit of governmental leaders be held.
However, there was disagreement on how far economic cooperation
should be taken at this time.

Singapore had made tremendous

economic strides and advocated increased economic cooperation and
reduced tariffs barriers.

However, Indonesia, still making the

transformation from import substitution and heavily dependent on
the export of raw

materia~s,

particularly petroleum was not

enthusiastic about the idea. Though Singapore realized that they
could not be the regional leader, Lee Kuan Yew used his position
to keep

ASEAN focused on achieving real progress in the area of

economic cooperation (Palmer 1987: 46).

As the organization

became "a growing realty" the economic foreign ministers who had
previously not been involved in the decision making process
became an integral part of the pre-summit planning.

(ASEAN 1978:

81).
The first Summit meeting of Heads of State was held in Bali,
Indonesia, in February 1976.

ASEAN in its own ten year history

stated: "This historical event will prove to be an important
turning point in the history of ASEAN,

" .bring new hopes and

brighter prospects for its future" (ASEAN 1978: 82).

The Summit

confirmed the commitment of the member nations to the original
goals of ASEAN.

To that end three documents were signed: the

Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
in Southeast Asia, and the Agreement on the Establishment of an
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ASEAN Secretariat.

The most important of these documents from an

organizational view was the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

The

treaty took the basic principles enunciated in the Bangkok
declaration and expanded them to twenty articles (appendix 0).
In addition this treaty established a dispute resolution
mechanism.

The key principle enunciated was: "mutual respect for

the interdependence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity
and national identity of all nations (appendix 0)."

The Treaty

also reiterated the ZOPFAN concept with the statement: "The right
of every State to lead its national existence free from external
interference, subversion or coercion" (appendix 0).
The declaration of ASEAN concord was also a key affirmation
to increase both political and economic cohesion.

Yet, though

the underlying reason for ASEAN's existence was security the only
mention to that issue was that cooperation shoUld continue on "a
non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in
accordance with their mutual needs and interests" (appendix E).
This decision was made because they did not want to be viewed as
a security alliance.

This was in hopes of not antagonizing

Indochina and leaving the door open for reconciliation between
the Indochinese states and ASEAN.

But even if reconCiliation was

to have taken place the difference in both ideology and economic
systems would have prevented the Indochinese states from becoming
members.

Furthermore, "Vietnam steadfastly refused to

acknowledge ASEAN as a corporate entity." ... Also "at the time
of the Bali summit, Vietnam's position was not only hostile but
also alarming because of open support proffered to revolutionary
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movements in the region"

(Leifer 1989: 73).

established the ASEAN Secretariat.

The summit also

However, the Secretariat

itself was given limited power; and the Secretary general was not
Secretary General of ASEAN but only of the ASEAN Secretariat.
Still upon completion of the Bali conference ASEAN had
finally transformed into international institution.

The success

of revolutionary communism in Indochina and the fear of same by
the membership of ASEAN made the Bali summit possible.

Yet,

without the preceding years of development it is unlikely that an
institution such as ASEAN and the level of cooperation attained
by the non-communist members of their region could have been
obtained.
With renewed commitment to the principles of promoting
economic cooperation the ASEAN economic ministers met in Kuala
Lumpur in March of 1976.

The economic ministers proposed setting

up five economic committees under their control rather than the
foreign ministers to further economic cooperation. "In fact the
economic ministers proposed that they directly report to the
heads of government rather than through Foreign Ministers"
(Palmer 1987: 54).

The economic ministers also established a

group of experts to study the concept of industrial production
"under ASEAN auspices: urea in Indonesia, urea in Malaysia,
superphosphate in the Philippines, diesel engines in Singapore,
and soda ash in Thailand" (ibid).

The most significant proposal

of this second meeting of economic ministers was the decision to
establish procedures for dialogues with third countries.
However, the proposal to have the economic ministers report
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directly to heads of government was rejected at the ninth meeting
of Foreign Ministers.

The Foreign Ministers stated that they

retained control of ASEAN policy and would conduct all external
relations.
Results in increased economic cooperation were forthcoming
with next meeting of foreign ministers approving preferential
trading agreements at a special meeting in February of 1977.

The

next summit of ASEAN heads of state was held at Kuala Lumpur in
August 1977.

The primary purpose of this meeting was to

celebrate ASEAN's tenth anniversary.

In comparison to the 1976

Bali summit, this meeting produced less dramatic results.
Organizational problems were resolved at this meeting, as the
economic ministers received authority to report directly to the
heads of government.

But the heads of state reaffirmed the

annual foreign minister meeting as the principal policy making
organ of ASEAN.

President Marcos dropped the Philippines claim

to Sabah, removing an obstacle to further regional cooperation.
The summit's most distinctive achievement was the
international recognition that ASEAN received.

The summit was

attended by the Prime ministers of Australia, Japan and New
Zealand.

Attendance by other foreign heads of state added an

aura of respectability to ASEAN it hitherto had not had.

"Of

special significance was the presence of Takeo Fukuda marking a
major Japanese reappraisal of the importance and role of the
association" (Leifer 1989: 81). Previously Japan had been
skeptical about both the success and credentials of ASEAN and
expressing concern in 1971 over the concept of ZOPFAN.
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But the

success of communism in Indochina caused Japan to rethink its
views.

Michael Leifer notes that "the presence of Malcom Fraser

from Australia and Robert Muldoon from New Zealand was encouraged
... by a concern not to make Mr Fukuda's visit the prime object
of the post-summit occasion" (Leifer 1989: 82).

The Summit also

marked the formal establishment of dialogue partners.
Even with the success of revolutionary communism in
Indochina, the final communique made no mention of security
concerns. Rather the communique

expressed "the desire to develop

peaceful and mutual beneficial relations with all countries in
the region, including Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam"
195).

(ASEAN 1978:

The communique also expressed a desire to further the

concept of ZOPFAN with the unification of Vietnam and the
withdrawal of the U.S. ground combat forces from Indochina.
In the first ten years of its existence ASEAN transformed
from a desire to seek out a means for regional cooperation among
the non-communist nations of the region to a recognized regional
institution.

Highlighting this transformation was the

establishment of relations and dialogue by 1977 with the EEC,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, and the United States.
Group participation in the United Nations had extended to the
conference on Trade and Development and the United Nations
Development Program.

The first ten years also saw genuine

strides towards ASEAN economic cooperation with the establishment
of preferential trade agreements and a swap arrangement (swap is
a standby credit agreement).
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In summary, ASEAN had advanced from an embryonic concept
with roots in ASA and Haphilindo into a viable regional
organization with international recognition.

However, it must be

noted that even in 1977 the underlying reason for the
association's existence was the security.

By uniting under the

banner of ASEAN the non-communist nations of Southeast Asia had
pursued the concept a security alliance.

The nations that

comprised ASEAN knew that alone or collectively they could not
defend against external aggressor.

But by uniting under a common

banner they effectively presented themselves as an organized
collective force.

International recognition of this collectivity

was seen in the number of dialogue partners who began to consult
with ASEAN as the

regional representative of non-communist

nations.
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1977-1994
CAMBODIA
One effect of the Second Indochina War was to divide
Southeast Asia into two ideological blocs, with Burma abstaining
from either.

But with the withdrawal of U.S.

troops from

Thailand in 1976, Vietnam began to reach out toward ASEAN.
Following Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien's tour of the region,
Hanoi established diplomatic relations with each of the ASEAN
governments.

Simultaneously, ASEAN also attempted to improve

relations with Laos and Cambodia.

ASEAN and particularly

Thailand felt comfortable with Cambodia's taking a path
independent from Vietnam and thus acting as a buffer between
Vietnam and ASEAN.
possibly come to

It seemed that the concept of ZOPFAN could
fulfillment and membership for the Indochinese

states in ASEAN was openly discussed.
This feeling of comfort proved to be short lived as tensions
between Vietnam and Cambodia, and between Vietnam and China,
escalated.

Anxieties mounted further in November of 1978

following Vietnam's signing of a treaty of friendship with the
Soviet Union.

Vietnam's decision to become a member of COMECON

also caused concern in the ASEAN capitals.

Vietnam's invasion of

Cambodia shattered any hope of reconciliation with ASEAN;
moreover, the Sino-Russian and Sino-Vietnam hostilities further
exacerbated the situation.

Consequently, China supported Pol Pot

and the Khmer Rouge against the Vietnamese.

Thus, the region's

conflicts were again internationalized, and the region thrust
onto the stage of great power competition.
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This sequence of

events greatly troubled ASEAN, as once again a common threat
acted as a catalyst for greater cooperation.
The invasion frightened the Thais into seeking quick
improvement of relations with China.

Secret negotiations with

China in January of 1979 "paved the way for material provision
for a Khmer Rouge insurgency and withdrawal of support for the
Communist Party of Thailand" (Leifer 1989: 91).

The other

nations of ASEAN did not feel as threatened as Thailand, yet
ASEAN's credibility would have been damaged or destroyed without
a collective response to Vietnam's invasion. China's punitive
attack across Vietnam's northern border widened the conflict and
unnerved all the ASEAN members, as did the prospect of another
huge wave of refugees from the fighting.

This fear caused

considerable alarm in the ASEAN capitals, which feared that a
large refugee population would further exacerbate internal
instability.
On January 9, 1979, Indonesia's Foreign Minister and Chair
of the ASEAN standing Committee issued a statement condemning the
escalation and enlargement of the conflict between the two
Indochina states.

On January 12, a special meeting of the ASEAN

Foreign Ministers convened in Bangkok, calling for the withdrawal
of all foreign forces from Cambodia.

The choice of Bangkok

expressed solidarity with what had become ASEAN's front line
state and marked a shift away from Jakarta as the focal point of
ASEAN activity.

In November 1979, ASEAN successfully sponsored a

United Nations resolution calling for the withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops for Cambodia.
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ASEAN also insisted that the People's Republic of Cambodia
under the leadership of Heng Samrin was illegitimate.

Following

the initial ASEAN response to the Vietnamese action, ASEAN
effectively focused international attention on Cambodia by
sponsoring resolutions at the United Nations and appealing to
their dialogue partners.

ASEAN argued that there was a linkage

between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Vietnam's actions
in Cambodia. Additionally, ASEAN led the effort to prevent the
Heng Samrin regime from taking Cambodia's seat at the United
Nations, supporting instead the credentialing of a coalition of
Cambodian resistance fighters.

Although ASEAN stayed united

diplomatically against Vietnam, there was concern in Kuala Lumpur
and Jakarta about China's increasing regional influence.

Thus,

when China launched its punitive attack against Vietnam's
northern border, ASEAN issued a statement

calling for the

withdrawal of all foreign forces from areas of conflict in
Indochina.
Another result of the Vietnamese action was to shift the
focus of the ASEAN armed forces from internal security
external threats.

to

The reason for this shift to external threats

was the withdrawal of American forces from Indochina and the
subsequent down sizing of the American military presence in
Southeast Asia.

The Soviet Navy also had started to make regular

appearances in the region's waters and had signed access
agreements with the Vietnamese.

In response, cooperation between

ASEAN states in the area of military cooperation increased
dramatically.

Military cooperation was not undertaken under the
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auspices of ASEAN, but it did take place bilaterally because
ASEAN did not want to be perceived as a security alliance (ASEAN
as an entity has never held joint military operations).
Additionally, Thailand's improving relations with China were not
viewed enthusiastically by Indonesia or Malaysia.

Instead, Kuala

Lumpur and Jakarta considered China to be the long term threat to
regional security.

Nonetheless, ASEAN remained diplomatically

united in seeking a solution to the Cambodian situation,
collectively proposing numerous solutions.

By utilizing

international forums for their proposals, ASEAN was able to keep
the Cambodian problem high on the political agenda in other
capitals of the world.

These collective efforts increased

overall cooperation among the ASEAN states.
The turning point in the Cambodian crisis stemmed from the
changing aspects of the Cold War, and Vietnam's decision in 1986
to purse Doi Moi or economic renovation.

Hanoi

knew that in

order to improve its economic prospects Vietnam could not
continue to support an expensive occupation force in Cambodia.
Though by 1984 some troops had been withdrawn, Vietnam's
leadership was also aware that in order to attract western
support and investment they would have to resolve this crisis.
The rise of Mikhael Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and the turmoil
in the Eastern European communist nations also influenced
Vietnam's leadership.

Consequently, after a decade of

occupation, Vietnam withdrew its remaining forces from Cambodia
in September of 1989.
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In this environment, peace talks began in Paris to resolve
the Cambodia problem.

An important preceding event to the Paris

talks were the "cocktail parties" hosted by
1989.

Jakarta in 1988 and

Therefore, the success of the Paris peace talks,

sUbsequent elections, and the installation of a coalition
government headed by Sihanouk in Phnom Penh can be considered a
success for ASEAN.
However, with the resolution of the Cambodian situation and
the collapse of the Soviet Empire the principal threats to
security and regional stability that united ASEAN dissipated,
allowing other regional conflicts that were on the back banner to
resurface.

Examples of these include the territorial disputes

over the Spratly Islands, which also involve China.

Other

maritime and territorial disputes throughout the region are also
resurfacing.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Though ASEAN has existed as an entity since 1967, there was
no serious effort at economic cooperation until the 1976 Bali
summit.

Combined with the summit of 1977, the proposed framework

for economic cooperation seemed substantial (i.e., preferential
trading agreement, industrial projects and a SWAP agreement).
However, the reality of economic cooperation between the members
of ASEAN has proved elusive.

For example, only two of the five

industrial cooperation projects approved by the ASEAN economic
foreign ministers in 1976, were completed by 1988.

One reason

for the lack of success was Singapore's decision to drop the
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diesel engine plant project after Indonesia's decision to
undertake a similar non-ASEAN project of its own.

This lack of

progress in economic cooperation was evident at the third Summit
of ASEAN leaders in 1987, (held to celebrate the twentieth
anniversary of the Bangkok Declaration).

At this Summit, a call

for greater economic cooperation was again voiced and the
agreement for joint industrial projects was revised.
When considering economic cooperation among ASEAN states one
must recognize that the size, level of industrialization,
economic policies and links with the global economy differ for
each ASEAN state.

The two highest hurdles that ASEAN has yet to

cross are the pre-existing economic ties with the rest of the
world, mainly former colonial rulers and Japan.

The second and

highest hurdle, which may prove insurmountable, is the
competitive rather than complementary nature of the ASEAN
economies.

All the

nations of ASEAN (except Brunei) produce and

export similar goods that are often in direct competition with
each other in the global market.

Even Singapore now faces

increased competition from Malaysia and Thailand for
technologically advanced manufactured goods.

One of the most

significant hindrances to increased economic cooperation are the
domestic industries in each nation.

Many of these industries

enjoy government protection (and are often members of the
governing elites themselves) and as such do not enthusiastically
view increased economic cooperation or
protection.

reduced tariff

Thus, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines

continue to have high tariffs for many
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industries that would

fail if free trade and increased economic cooperation became a
reality.
Still differing levels of economic cooperation exist within
ASEAN. The best example of intra-regional cooperation is between
Singapore and the adjacent Malaysian provinces.

Long term

prospects for increased cooperation, however, remain elusive.
Highlighting this fact is that Thailand is increasing economic
cooperation with Laos at a much faster rate than with the ASEAN
states.

This level of cooperation should increase dramatically

this year with the opening of the first bridge across the Mekong
river linking the two nations.
In summary, although the nations of ASEAN remain competitive
rather then complementary, ASEAN has achieved

economic success

by negotiating as a regional bloc for reduced tariffs and
favorable trade terms with the United States, Japan and the
European Economic Community.
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CONCLUSION
Although composed of six quite dissimilar members ASEAN has
survived in a highly volatile environment for a quarter of a
century.

This proven durability itself constitutes ASEAN's

greatest achievement.

Evolving from two failed attempts at a

regional organization, ASEAN has become Southeast Asia's regional
forum for both intra- and extra-regional issues.

Yet, even after

two decades ASEAN still does not constitute an international
organization, regime or convention, but has metamorphically
impersonated each.

Rather, ASEAN has transformed itself over the

last twenty-five years, taking the form of an organization,
regime or convention as circumstances have required.

With each

successive crisis ASEAN has adapted its form to the prevailing
environment.

Yet upon resolution of the crisis ASEAN reverts to

its original form - an agreement to disagree.
ASEAN can best be described as a club, more specifically a
club comprised of the elites from the member nations.

Southeast

Asian diplomats themselves use the club metaphor when describing
ASEAN to outsiders.

Examination of ASEAN's history highlights

its shape-shifting abilities.

For example, following the

unification of Vietnam, at the Bali Summit, ASEAN assumed the
form of a regional organization by establishing a Secretariat and
setting down a dispute resolution mechanism.

But previously,

following the ZOPFAN declaration, ASEAN could best have been
described as an embryonic regime that tried to establish the norm
of great power non-interference in the region.

Though it never

came to fruition, ZOPFAN was an attempt by ASEAN to establish not
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only an intra-regional regime, but an international regime by
attempting to expanded membership to the world's great powers.
Following the Summit of 1977, ASEAN's shape took the form of a
convention, a loose organization with implicit rules as the ASEAN
states attempted reconciliation with the Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia.

ASEAN altered once again following Vietnam's

occupation of Cambodia, assuming the shape of an international
organization by strengthening its ability to
collectively to events.

respond

This alteration permitted ASEAN

to

respond to the invasion with a unified front and to
internationalize the conflict.

There are other instances of this

adapting form to the circumstances, but again ASEAN continually
returns to its club-like form.
Currently, ASEAN is in another transition period.

Following

its success in helping to resolve the Cambodian problem, the
members of ASEAN no longer face a common threat.

This lack of

consensus within the institution was evident at the Fourth Summit
of ASEAN Heads of State in 1992.

Although Laos and Vietnam

attained observer status, and China and Russia attended for the
first time, internal drift was evident by the rejection of
Singapore's proposal that an invitation to sign the Treaty of
Amity and Concord be made to the five permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council.

Malaysia's proposal for an

economic bloc with the Japanese was also rejected.

The most

significant of these two was the rejection of Singapore's
proposal that theoretically would have furthered the goal of
ZOPFAN.

Furthermore, in response to the formation of free trade
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zones in Europe and North America, ASEAN approved an ASEAN Free
Trade Zone to be implemented by 2008 at the 1992 Summit.

But as

of 1994 no concrete steps toward implementation have been
undertaken.

This is because as noted above the ASEAN members are

economic competitors and subsequently ill-suited for economic
integration.

Similarly, at the Foreign Ministers meeting in 1992

a call was made for ASEAN, China, and Vietnam to negotiate
peacefully on issues of sovereignty and economic exploitation in
the South China Sea, but no headway was made toward settlement of
conflicting claims among the members themselves.

Notably, at

this meeting China and Vietnam signed onto an ASEAN proposal for
joint development (Barnett 1993: 47). Therefore at this juncture
ASEAN may be transforming into a convention once again.
Thus, ASEAN has evolved as an institution whose ability to
take on various forms has served the interests of its members
extremely well for the last twenty-five years.

Yet, ASEAN as an

institution can be viewed as either a success or a failure.

If

one bases evaluations on the Bangkok Declaration and its emphasis
on economic cooperation, then ASEAN has not achieved success.
The success of ASEAN lies in its aforementioned ability to
transform itself in response to changing regional circumstances.
Yet, what explains this ability to survive twenty years of
existence?

If ASEAN has at one time or another constituted a

regime, does regime theory have value when examining ASEAN?
These questions are even more interesting when one considers the
numerous other attempts at regional cooperation around the globe
that have failed.
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REGIME THEORY
Still, labeling ASEAN proves elusive.

On close examination

what one finds is a web of interconnected relationships among the
member nations that constitute a hybrid of Keohane's three types
of institutions:

"International institutions include formal

intergovernmental or transnational organizations, international
regimes, and conventions." (Rittberger 1993: 28).
explains ASEAN's success?

But, what

I argue that international regime

theories provide valuable insight into understanding how ASEAN
has managed not only to survive, but flourish.
Regime formation theories attempt to understand the process
by which effective regimes are created.

By

extension they

provide valuable insight into regime preservation and
maintenance.

Further, if regime formation theories make

plausible assumptions about regime creation, it follows that if
these factors decay a regime may collapse, although the point at
which a regime begins to decay and collapse is a topic of
scholarly debate.

For the purposes of this paper, I will extend

the basic tenets of the regime formation theories contained in
appendix B to cover formation, maintenance, and decay.

The

following section will examine point by point the theories
covered in appendix B and the explanations they might provide for
ASEAN's success.
The first and most widely debated group of regime formation
theories are power based.

As previously discussed the most

popular of this group emphasizes the role of hegemony.

But as

discussed above, no global hegemon (i.e., the U.S., or the Soviet
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Union) was involved in the creation of ASEAN.

As such the

hegemonic hypotheses is not applicable to ASEAN's case.
power based theories also fail to explain ASEAN.

Other

However, in

Southeast Asia itself, Indonesia could be considered the regional
hegemon.

The relevance here is that previous attempts at intra-

regional cooperation failed until Indonesia under Sukarno decided
to support the concept of ASEAN.

Still, in the strictest sense,

the power based theories offer little in the way of explaining
ASEAN's creation or success.
The next subset of theories is the interest based
hypotheses. The concepts contained in these theories do provide
valuable insight in attempting to understand why
thrived.

ASEAN has

Scrutiny of the motives behind the first ten years of

ASEAN's existence clearly are articulated by the basic premise of
the interest based theories: "Social institutions, including
international regimes arise from the interaction of selfinterested parties endeavoring to coordinate their behavior to
reap joint gains that may but need not take the form of public
goods (Appendix B)."

Young has separated the interest based

hypotheses into ten variables that may explain successful regime
formation.
Five of these ten variables considered necessary for
effective regime formation by the interest based hypotheses apply
at one period or another to ASEAN, the relevance of two other
variables is debatable (see appendix B for further discussion of
each point):
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1.

Integrative bargaining and a veil of uncertainty.

A veil of uncertainty has surrounded events in the entire region
since the end of World War II.

Thus a veil of uncertainty has

affected each of the founding members of ASEAN throughout their
histories.

The most significant uncertainty for the founding

members of ASEAN in 1967 was internal security.

Additionally,

the continued uncertainty of events in Indochina contributed to
ASEAN's continued cooperation.

Arguably these two factors have

been important in holding ASEAN together.
2.

Equity.

"The availability of institutional options that all

participants can accept as equitable (rather than efficient) is
necessary" for regime formation has not been a major factor for
ASEAN.

Though it should be noted that the chair of the ASEAN

standing committee is rotated annually, which may not be
efficient, but can be considered equitable.

3.

Salient solutions. For its members ASEAN has provided

solutions to regional concerns.

Examples include the unified

front ASEAN takes when dealing with extra-regional entities,
particularly in the area of trade.
4.

Exogenous shocks or crises.

This tenet of the interest based

hypotheses refers to the catalyst of each successive step towards
greater cooperation within ASEAN.

Arguably without the common

crises faced by the ASEAN membership the association might have
ceased to exist.

Responding to shocks has also been the cause

for ASEAN's frequent transformations.
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5.

Policy priority.

views:

The literature contains two divergent

·Success in regime formation can occur only when the issue

at stake achieves high-priority status ...• ·Alternatively, it is
easier to from a regime when the subject matter is not high on
the political agendas of the parties.·

ASEAN in its twenty-five

year history has shown both views to be valid.

ASEAN has

effectively acted when a crisis has threatened the member nations
and resolving or mediating the threat has been high on the
political agenda.

Yet, when there are no common threats ASEAN's

reversion to club status has helped it to remain viable.
6.

Common good.

·A willingness to set aside narrow national

interests in favor of some broader conception of the common good
is necessary to achieve success in regime formation.·

This may

have been the case in response to the Cambodian invasion.
However, this easily could have been an anomaly, because the
members of ASEAN jealously guard their sovereignty, and it is
doubtful that the member nations would have come to Thailand's
aid if invaded by Vietnam.

This was evident in the Thai decision

to reach out to China and Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur's wariness of
this move.

Thus it is arguable that the association's members

will not set aside ·narrow national interests in favor of the
common good.·

As such this aspect of the interest based

hypotheses may have no value when examining ASEAN.

7.

Science and technology.

Not relevant to ASEAN's formation or

continued survival.
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8.

Relevant parties.

The second Indochina war broke Southeast

Asia into ideological blocs, communist versus anti-communist,
with ASEAN comprising the regions anti-communist bloc.

Yet this

mayor may not be relevant to ASEAN's success in that some extraregional powers (i.e., the U.S.) could also be considered
relevant parties in the fight against communism.
9.

Compliance mechanisms. ASEAN has yet to establish any type of

compliance mechanisms.

10.

Individuals as leaders.

The leadership of ASEAN from its

formation until the present has remained remarkably stable.
Further, politics in each nation are dominated by a national
elite who's perception of both regional and extra-regional events
more closely match the elites of other nations rather than their
own countrymen.

This factor may be the single greatest

contributor to ASEAN's survival.

However, as the older

generation passes the reins of power and democracy takes a firmer
hold in the region, it is uncertain that the new elites will
remain as committed as their predecessors have been to ASEAN.
The knowledge-based hypotheses about epistemic communities
and cognitive factors lacked explanatory power in 1967.

But, in

attempting to understand the longevity of ASEAN, these factors
take on greater significance.

One result of the last twenty-five

years is the matrices of regular and frequent consultation among
governmental elites of the member nations.

This has established

personnel contacts and relationships at numerous levels which are
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now expanding to the private sector.

In addition a common ASEAN

jargon and ASEAN community also has developed. Though hard to
examine these shared values and learning experiences

may

translate into the strongest of all the factors that bind ASEAN
together.
Returning to the original question of whether international
regime theories have value when examining regime formation among
small to mid-range powers, the answers is yes.

Although

classifying ASEAN has proved elusive, regime theories explain the
forces behind the success of ASEAN over the last twenty-five
years.

Of the three main classifications of regime formation

hypotheses the two with the greatest value are the interest based
and knowledge based.

However, the power based theories could

have some significance if one considers Indonesia to have played
the role of a regional hegemon in ASEAN's formation and continued
success.
In conclusion, as the world seeks to foster greater
cooperation, there are important lessons to be drawn from ASEAN's
experience.

In the area of regime formation and increased

international cooperation the concepts proposed by the interest
based hypotheses seem the most relevant.

For ASEAN leadership, a

veil of uncertainty and exogenous shocks or crises were the most
important factors.

However, explanations for the survival of an

international institution seem to be contained in the knowledge
based approach.

The cognitive concept that shared contacts and

learning experiences lead to effective regime formation may
contain the answer for long term institutional survival.
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These

cognitive factors have definitely influenced ASEAN and
contributed to its success.

Quite simply they they have become

the glue that binds ASEAN together when it reverts to its clublike status and maintains the commitment to cooperate even when
internal drift is high.

But the most important lesson to be

learned from ASEAN may be contained in the words of Malaysia's
Foreign Minister "Make Haste Slowly."
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Appendix A
Five questions that should be asked of every regime.
1.
Institutional Character.
What are the principal rights,
rUles, and social choice procedures of the regime? How do they
structure the behavior of individuals actors to produce a stream
of collective outcomes?
2.
Jurisdictional boundaries.
What is the coverage of the
regime in terms of functional scope, areal domain, and
membership? Is this coverage appropriate under prevailing
conditions?
3. Conditions tor operation. What conditions are necessary for
the regime to work at all? Under what conditions will the
operation of the regime yield particularly desirable results (for
example, economic efficiency, distributive justice, ecological
balance)?
4.
Consequences of operation. What sorts of outcomes (either
individual or collective) can the regime be expected to produce?
What are the appropriate criteria for evaluating these outcomes?
5.
Regime dynamics.
How did the regime come into existence, and
what is the likelihood that it will experience changes in the
foreseeable future? Does the regime include transformation rules
that are likely to be effective?
(Young 1989: 29)
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Appendix B
Template ot Hypotheses to Be Tested
A.
Power-based hypotheses
Basic Premise:
Institutions, including international regimes,
are structured by and reflect the distribution and configuration
of power in international society.
1. Hegemony.
The most widely discussed hypothesis in this set,
which arises from hegemonic stability theory, states that the
presence of a hegemon (that is, an actor possessing a
preponderance of material resources) is a necessary condition for
regime formation in international society.
a.
Benign hegemony: the hegemon, functioning as the
dominant member of a privileged group, supplies institutional
arrangements to others as public goods.
b.
Coercive hegemony:
the hegemon exercises
structural power to impose institutional arrangements favorable
to itself, regardless of the consequences for others.
2. Other power-based hypotheses are possible.
examples to consider.

Here are some

a.
A bipolar or bimodal distribution of power (produ~ing a
balance of power) is necessary for success in regime formation.
b.
The greater the degree of symmetry in the distribution
of power, the more likely efforts to create regimes are to
succeed.
c.
The existence of a small group of great powers in a
given issue area (that is, a directorate) enhances prospects for
regime formation.
B.
Interest-based hypotheses
Basic Premise:
Social institutions, including international
regimes arise from the interaction of self-interested parties
endeavoring to coordinate their behavior to reap joint gains that
may but need not take the form of public goods.
It follows that
the availability of joint gains or, in other words, a contract
zone or zone of agreements constitutes a necessary (though not
sufficient) condition for the formation of international regimes.
There is, however,
no need to assume that the parties possess
full or complete information regarding the extent or precise
nature of the feasible or joint gains at the outset. (In some
situations parties dispute or disagree regarding the existence or
scope of joint gains.) Efforts to construct theories about the
resilient interactions address the following question:
Why do
actors in international society succeed in forming international
regimes to reap feasible gains in some cases but not in others?
The processes leading to success or failure are ordinarily
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conceptualized as bargaining or negotiation; the hypotheses of
interest to us identify determinants of success or failure in the
resultant institutional bargaining.
1.
Integrative bargaining and a veil of uncertainty.
Institutional bargaining can succeed only when the prominence of
integrative bargaining and/or the presence of a veil of
uncertainty make it easy for the partners to approach the problem
under consideration in contractarian terms.
2. Equity.
The availability of institutional options
that all participants can accept as equitable (rather than
efficient) is necessary for institutional bargaining to succeed.
3. Salient solutions.
The existence of a salient solution
(or focal point describable in simple terms) increases the
probability of success in institutional bargaining.
4.
Exogenous shocks or crises.
Shocks or crises
occurring outside of the bargaining process increase the
probability of success in efforts to negotiate the terms of
international regimes.
5.
Policy priority.
(a) Success in regime formation
can occur only when the issue at stake achieves high-priority
status on the policy agenda of each of the participants.
(b)
Alternatively, it is easier to from a regime when the subject
matter is not high on the political agendas of the parties.
6.
Common good.
A willingness to set aside narrow
national interests in favor of some broader conception of the
common good is necessary to achieve success in regime formation.
7. Science and technology.
(a) The greater the tendency
for parties to concentrate on scientific or technical
considerations as opposed to political issues, the greater the
likelihood of successful regime formation.
(b) The greater the
role of negotiators with scientific or technical competence
in relation to those with political credentials, the greater the
likelihood for successful regime formation.
(c) It is easier to
form a regime when the issues at state are highly technical.
8.
Relevant parties. All parties with an interest in
the problem must participate in the negations for regime
formation to succeed.
9.
Compliance mechanisms.
The probability for success
in institutional bargaining rises when compliance mechanisms that
the parties regard as clear-cut and effective are available.
10.
Individuals as leaders.
Institutional bargaining
is likely to succeed when individual leadership emerges; it will
fail in the absence of such leadership.
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C.
Knowledge-based hypotheses
Basic Premise:
Shared perceptions, beliefs, and understandings
of causal mechanisms among the relevant parties as well as
identifiable communities, including epistemic communities and
advocacy organizations, that arise to propagate this knowledge
are important determinants of regime formation.
Some would argue
that cognitive considerations - including ideas, values and
learning shared through transnational alliances, nongovernmental
organizations, and groups of experts - constitute a more
significant factor in regime formation than power or the
interests of states. Two alternative accounts of how cognitive
concerns influence regime formation are identifiable in the
literature.
1.
Scientific convergence.
Agreement or consensus
within the scientific community regarding causal relations and
appropriate responses is a prerequisite for regime formation.
(Values are less important, though not irrelevant, to this
hypotheses than to the next hypothesis. )
2.
Epistemic communities. A group of individuals (whose
membership usually transcends national boundaries and includes
both scientists or experts and policy makers) who share a common
view regarding causal mechanisms and appropriate responses and
who have a common set of values emerges in conjunction with the
issue in question.
For a regime to form some mechanism (possibly
an international organization but in some cases a less formal
network) arises to link the members of this group.
The resulting
epistemic community is able not only to promote its own preferred
arrangements but also prevent opposing views and values from
becoming influential or dominant at the domestic level in each of
the relevant states.
D. Contextual factors
National and world circumstances and events seemingly unrelated
to the issue area under consideration play a major role in
determining if and when international cooperation to address a
particular problem or issue area occurs and in shaping the
content of any regime that forms.
(Young and Osherenko 1993: 263-266)
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Appendix C
The ASEAN Declaration
(The Bangkok Declaration)
The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, the Deputy Prime Minister of
Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines,
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Thailand:
MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interest and common
problems among countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the
need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional
solidarity and cooperation,
DESIRING to establish a firm foundation for common action to
promote regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirt of
equality and partnership and thereby contribute towards peace,
progress and prosperity in the region,
CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly interdependent world, the
cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic
well-being are best maintained by fostering good understanding,
good neighborliness and meaningful cooperation among the
countries of the region already bound together by ties of history
and culture.
CONSIDERING that the countries of South-East Asia share a
primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social
stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and
progressive national development, and that they are determined to
ensure their stability and security from external interference in
any form as manifestation in order to preserve their national
identities in accordance with the ideals and aspiration of their
peoples,
AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain
only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned
and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert
the national independence and freedom of States in the area or
prejudice the orderly processes of their national development,
DO HEREBY DECLARE:
FIRST, the establishment of an Association for Regional
Cooperation among the countries of South-East Asia to be known as
the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
be:

Second, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall

1.
To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and
cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the
spirt of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the
foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East
Asian Nations,
2.
To promote regional peace and stability through abiding
respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among
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countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the
United Nations Charter,
3.
To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on
matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural,
technical, scientific and administrative fields;
4.
To provide assistance to each other in the form of training
and research facilities in the educational, professional,
technical and administrative spheres;
5.
To collaborate more effectively for greater utilization of
their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade,
including the study of the problems of international commodity
trade, the improvement of their transportation and communication
facilities and the raising of living standards of their peoples;
6. To promote South-East Asian studies;
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing
international and regional organization with similar aims and
purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation
among themselves.
THIRD, that, to carry out these aims and purposes, the
following machinery shall be established,
(a).
Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by
rotation and referred to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Special
Meetings of Foreign Ministers may be convened as required,
(b).
A standing Committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign
Minister of the host country or his representative and having as
its membership the accredited Ambassadors of the other member
countries, to carry out on the work of the Association in between
Meetings of Foreign Ministers;
(c).
Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists
and officials on specific subjects,
(d). A national Secretariat in each member country to carry out
the work of the Association on behalf of that country and to
service the Annual or Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the
Standing Committee and such other Committee as may hereafter be
established.
FOURTH, that the Association is open tor participation to
all States in the South-East Asian Region subscribing to the
aforementioned aims, principles and purposes.
FIFTH,
that the Association represents the collective will
of the nations of South-East Asia to bind themselves together in
friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and
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sacrifices, secure for their people and for posterity the
blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity.
Done in Bangkok on the Eight Day of August in the Year One
Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-Seven.
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Appendix D
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
PREAMBLE
The High Contracting Parties;
CONSCIOUS of the existing ties of history, geography and
culture, which have bound their people together;
ANXIOUS to promote regional peace and stability, friendship
and mutual cooperation on matters affecting Southeast Asia
consistent with the spirt and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-African
Conference in Bandung on 25 April 1955, the Declaration of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations signed in Bangkok on 8
August 1967, and the Declaration signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27
November 1971;
CONVINCED that the settlement of differences or disputes
between their countries should be regulated by rational,
effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative
attitude which might endanger or hinder cooperation;
BELIEVING in the need for cooperation with all peace loving nations, both within and outside Southeast Asia, in the
furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony;
SOLEMNLY AGREE to enter into a Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation as follows:
CHAPTER I
PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES
Article 1
The purpose of this treaty is to promote perpetual peace,
everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples which would
contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.
Article 2
In their relations with one another, the High Contracting
Parties shall be gUided by the following principles:
a.
Mutual respect for the interdependence,
sovereignty,
equality, territorial integrity and
national identity of all
nations;
b.
The right of every State to lead its national
exis tence free fr om external int erfer ence, subversion
coercion;
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or

c.
Non-interference in the internal affairs of one
another;
d.

Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful

e.

Renunciation of the threat or use of force;

f.

Effective cooperation among themselves.

means;

CHAPTER II
AMITY
Article 3
In pursuance of the purpose of this treaty the High
contracting Parties shall endeavor to develop and strengthen the
traditional, cultural and historical ties of friendship, good
neighborliness and cooperation which bind them together and shall
fUlfil in good faith and obligations assumed under this Treaty.
In order to promote closer understanding among them, the High
Contracting parties shall encourage and facilitate contact and
intercourse among their peoples.
CHAPTER III
COOPERATION
Article 4
The High Contracting Parties shall promote active
cooperation in the economic, social, technical, scientific and
administrative fields as well as in matters of common ideals and
aspiration of international peace and stability in the region and
all other matters of common interest.
Article 5
Pursuant to Article 4 the High Contracting Parities shall
exert their maximum eftorts multilaterally as well as bilaterally
on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and mutual benefit.
Article 6
The High ContractIng Parties shall collaborate for the
acceleration of the economic growth in the region in order to
strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community
of nations in Southeast Asia.
To this end, they shall promote
the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the
expansion of their trade and the improvement of their economic
infra-structure for the mutual benefit ot their peoples.
In this
regard, they shall continue to explore all avenues for close and
beneficial cooperation with other States as well as international
and regional orgainisations [SIC] outside the region.
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Article 7
The High Contracting Parties, in order to achieve social
justice and to raise the standards of living of the peoples of
the region, shall intensify economic cooperation.
For this
purpose, they shall adopt appropriate regional strategies for
economic development and mutual assistance.
Article 8
The High Contracting Parties shall strive to achieve the
closest cooperation on the widest scale and shall seek to provide
assistance to one another in the form of training and research
facilities in the social, cUltural, technical, scientific and
administrative fields.
Article 9
The High Contracting Parities shall endeavor to foster
cooperation in the furtherance of the cause of peace, harmony and
stability in the region.
To this end, the High Contracting
Parties shall maintain regular contacts and consultations with
one another on international and regional matters with a view to
coordinating their views, actions and policies.
Article 10
Each High Contracting Party shall not in any manner or form
participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to
the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial
integrity of another High Contracting Party.
Article 11
The High Contracting Parties shall endeavor to strengthen
their respective national resilience in their political,
economic, socio-cultural as well as security fields in conformity
with their respective ideals and aspirations, free from external
interference as well as internal subversive activities in order
to preserve their respective national identities.
Article 12
The High Contracting Parties in their efforts to achieve
regional prosperity and security, shall endeavor to cooperate in
all the fields for the promotion of regional resilience, based on
the principles of self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect,
cooperation and solidarity which will constitute the foundation
for a strong and viable community of nations in Southeast Asia.
CHAPTER IV
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Article 13

61

The High Contracting Parties shall have the determination
and good faith to prevent disputes from arising.
In case
disputes on matters directly affecting them shall refrain from
the threat or use of force and shall at all times settle such
disputes among themselves through friendly negotiations.
Article 14
To settle disputes through regional processes, the High
Contracting Parties shall constitute, as a continuing body, a
High Council comprising a Representative at Ministerial level
from each of the High Contracting Parties to take cognizance of
the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb
regional peace and harmony.
Article 15
In the event no solution is reached through direct
negotiation, the High Council shall take cognizance of the
dispute or the situation and shall recommend to the parities in
dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices,
mediation, inquiry or conciliation. The High Council may however
offer its good offices, or upon agreement of the parties in
dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry
or conciliation. When deemed necessary, the High Council shall
recommended appropriate measure for the prevention of a
deterioration of the dispute or the situation.
Article 16
The foregoing provision of this Chapter shall not apply to
dispute unless all the parties to the dispute agree to their
application to that dispute. However, this shall not preclude
the other High Contracting Parties not party to the dispute from
offering all possible assistance to settle the said dispute.
Parties to the dispute should be well disposed towards such
offers of assistance.
Article 17
Nothing in the Treaty shall preclude recourse to the modes
of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33 (1) of the Charter
of the United Nations.
The High Contracting Parties which are
parties to a dispute should be encouraged to take initiatives to
solve it by friendly negotiations before resorting to the other
procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.
CHAPTER V
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 18
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This treaty shall be signed by the Republic of Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of
Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand.
It shall be ratified in
accordance with the constitutional procedures of each signatory
State.
Article 19
This treaty shall enter into force on this date of the
deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification with the
Governments of the signatory States which are designated
Depositories of this Treaty and of the instruments of
ratification or accession.
Article 20
This Treaty is drawn up in the official languages of the
High Contracting Parties, all of which are equally authoritative.
There shall be an agreed common translation of the texts in the
English language.
Any divergent interpretation of the common
text shall be settled by negotiation.

IN FAITH THEREOF the High Contracting Parties have signed
the Treaty and have hereto affixed their Seals.
Done at Denpasar, Bali, this twenty-fourth day of February
in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six.
(signatories

for each nation are as follows,)

Soeharto, President of Indonesia
Datuk Hussein onn, Prime Minister of Malaysia
Ferdinand Marcos, President of the Philippines
Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore
Kukrit Pramoj, Prime Minister of Thailand
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Appendix E
DECLARATION OF ASEAN CONCORD
A COMMON BOND EXISTING AMONG THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ASSOCIATION
OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS,
The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime
Minister ot Malaysia, the President ot the Republic of the
Philippines, the Prime minister of the Republic of Singapore and
the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand,
REAFFIRM their commitment to the Declaration of Bandung,
Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, and the Charter of the United Nations;
ENDEAVOR to promote peace, progress, prosperity and the
welfare of the peoples of member states,
UNDERTAKE to consolidate the Achievements of ASEAN and
expand ASEAN cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and
political fields;
DO HEREBY DECLARE.
ASEAN cooperation shall take into account, among others, the
following objectives and principles in the pursuit of political
stability •
1.
The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region
is an essential contribution to international peace and security.
Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by
subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and
ASEAN resilience.
2.
Member states, individually and collectively, shall take
active steps for the early establishment of the Zone of Peace,
Freedom and Neutrality.
3.
The elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy
is a primary concern of member states.
They shall therefore
intensify cooperation in economic and social development, with
particular emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on the
improvement ot the living standards of their peoples.
4.
Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard the
pace of development of member states.
They shall extend, within
their capabilities, assistance for relief of member states in
distress
5. Member states shall take cooperative action in their national
and regional development programmes, utilizing as far as possible
the resources available in the ASEAN region to broaden the
complementarity of their respective economies.
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6.
Member states, in the spirt of ASEAN solidarity, shall rely
exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intraregional differences.
7.
Member states shall strive, individually and collectively, to
create conditions conducive to the promotion of peaceful
cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia on the basis of
mutual respect and mutual benefit.
8. Member states shall vigorously develop an awareness of
regional identity and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN
community, respected by all and respecting all nations on the
basis of mutually advantageous relationships, and in accordance
with the principles of self-determination, sovereign equality and
non-interference in the internal affairs of nations.
AND DO HEREBY ADOPT
The following programme of action as a framework for ASEAN
cooperation:
A.

POLITICAL

1.
Meetings of the Heads of Government of the member states
as and when necessary.
2.
Signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia.
3. Settlement of intra-regional disputes by peaceful means
as soon as possible.
4.
Immediate consideration of initial steps towards
recognition of and respect for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and
neutrality wherever possible.
5.
Improvement of ASEAN machinery to strengthen political
cooperation.
6.
Study on how to develop judicial cooperation including
the possibility of an ASEAN Extradition Treaty;
7.
Strengthening of political solidarity by promoting the
harmonization of views, coordinating position and, where possible
and desirable, taking common actions.
B.

ECONOMIC
1. Cooperation on Basic Commodities, particularly Food
and Energy
(il Member states shall assist each other by according
priority to the supply of the individual country's needs in
critical circumstance, and priority to the acquisition of
exports from members states, in respect of basic
commodities, particularly food and energy.
(ii) Member states shall also intensify cooperation in
the production of basic commodities particularly food and
energy in the individual member states of the region.
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2.

Industrial Cooperation

(i) Member states shall cooperate to establish large-scale
ASEAN industrial plants, particularly to meet regional
requirements of essential commodities.
(ii)
Priority shall be given to projects which utilize
the available materials in the members states, contribute to
the increase of food production, increase foreign exchange
earnings or save foreign exchange and create employment.
3.

Cooperation in Trade

(i)
Member states shall cooperate in the fields of trade in
order to promote development and growth of new production
and trade to improve the trade structures of individual
states and among the countries of ASEAN conducive to further
development and to safeguard and increase their foreign
exchange earnings and reserves.
(ii) Member states shall progress towards the establishment
of preferential trading arrangements as a long term
objective on a basis deemed to be at any particular time
appropriate through rounds of negotiations subject to the
unanimous agreement of member states.
(iii) The expansion of trade among member states shall be
facilitated through cooperation on basic commodities,
particularly in food and energy and through cooperation in
ASEAN industrial projects.
(iv) Members states shall accelerate joint efforts to
improve access to markets outside ASEAN for their raw
material and finished products by seeking the elimination of
all trade barriers in those markets, developing new usage
for these products and in adopting common approaches and
actions in dealing with regional groupings and individual
economic powers.
(v) Such efforts shall also lead to cooperation in the
filed of technology and production methods in order to
increase the production and to improve the quality of
export products, as well as to develop new export
products with a view to diversifying exports.
4.
Joint Approach to International Commodity Problems
and Other World Economic Problems
(i)
The principle of ASEAN cooperation on trade shall
also be reflected on a priority basis in joint approaches
to international commodity problems and other world
economic problems such as the reform of international
trading systems, the reform of international monetary system
and transfer of real resources, in the United Nations and
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other relevant multilateral tora, with a view to
contributing to the establishment of the New International
Economic Order.
(ii) Member states shall give priority to the
stabilisation (SIC) and increase of export earnings of
those commodities produced and exported by them through
commodity agreements including buffer stock schemes and
other means.
5. Machinery for Economic Cooperation
Ministerial meetings on economic matters shall be
held regularly or as deemed necessary in order to:
(i)
formulate recommendations for the consideration of
Governments of members states for the strengthening of ASEAN
economic cooperation;
(ii)
Review the coordination and implementation of
agreed ASEAN programmes and projects on economic
cooperation;
(iii) exchange views and consult on national
development plans and policies as a step towards
harmonizing regional development; and
(iv)
perform such other relevant functions as agreed" upon
by the member governments.
c.

Social

1. Cooperation in the field of social development, with
emphasis on the well being of low-income group and of rural
population, through the expansion of opportunities for productive
employment with fair remuneration.
2.
Support for the active involvement of all sectors and levels
of the ASEAN communities, particularly the women and youth, in
development efforts.
3.
Intensification and expansion of existing cooperation in
meeting the problems of population growth in the ASEAN region,
and where possible, formulation of new strategies in
collaboration with appropriate international agencies.
4.
Intensification of cooperation among member states as well as
with the relevant international bodies in the prevention and
eradication of the abuse of narcotics and the illegal trafficking
of drugs.
d.

Cultural and Information
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1.
Introduction of the study of ASEAN, its members states and
their national languages as part of the curricula of schools and
other institutions of learning in the members states.
2.
Support of ASEAN scholars, writers, artists and mass media
representatives to enable them to play an active role in
fostering a sense of regional identity and fellowship
3.
Promotion of Southeast Asian studies through closer
collaboration among national institutes.
E.

Security
Continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the
member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual
needs and interests.
f.

Improvement of ASEAN machinery

1. Signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN
Secretariat.
2.
Regular review of the ASEAN organizational structure with a
view to improving its effectiveness.
3.
Study of the desirability of a new constitutional framework
for ASEAN
DONE at Denpasar, Bali, this twenty-fourth day of February in the
year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six.
(signatories for each nation are as follows:)
Soeharto, President of Indonesia
Datuk Hussein Onn, Prime Minister of Malaysia
Ferdinand Marcos, President of the Philippines
Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore
Kukrit Pramoj, Prime Minister of Thailand
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Appendix F
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration
We the foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and the Special Envoy of the National Executive Council
of Thailand:
Firmly believing in the merits of regional co-operation
which has drawn our countries to co-operate together in economic,
social and cultural fields in the Association of South East Asian
Nations;
Desirous of bringing about a relaxation of international
tension and of achieving a lasting peace in South East Asia;
Inspired by the worthy aims and objectives of the United
Nations, in particular by the principles of respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, abstention
from threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international
disputes, equal rights and self-determination and noninterference in the affairs of States;
Believing in the continuing validity of the declaration on
the Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation of the Bandung
conference of 1955 which, among others, enunciates the principles
by which states may coexist peacefully;
Recognizing the right of every state, large or small, to
lead its national existence free from outside interference in its
internal affairs as this interference will adversely affects its
freedom, independence and integrity;
Dedicated to the maintenance of peace, freedom and
independence unimpaired;
Believing in the need to meet present challenges and new
developments by co-operating with all peace and freedom loving
nation, both within and outside the region, in the furtherance of
world peace, stability and harmony;
cognizant of the significant trend towards establishing
nuclear-free zones, as in the Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Lusaka Declaration
proclaiming Africa as a nuclear-free zone, for the purpose of
promoting world peace and security by reducing the areas of
international conflicts and tension;
Reiterating our commitment to the principle in the Bangkok
Declaration which establishment ASEAN in 1967, that the countries
of South East Asia share a primary responsibility for
strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and
ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development and
that they are determined to ensure stability and security from
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external interference in any form or manifestation in order to
preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals
and aspirations of their people;
Agreeing that the neutralization of South East Asia is a
desirable objective and that we should explore ways and means for
bringing about its realization; and
Convinced that the time is propitious for joint action to
give effective expression to the deeply felt desire of the people
of South East Asia to ensure the conditions of peace and
stability indispensable to their independence and their economic
social well-being;
Do Hereby State:
1.
that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to
secure the recognition of, respect for, South East Asia a Zone of
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free form any form of manner of
interference of outside powers;
2. that the South East Asian countries should make concerted
efforts to broaden the areas of co-operation which would
contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.
Done at Kuala Lumpur on Saturday, the 27th of November 1971.
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